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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Paul M. Slyman for the Master of Science in Geography 
presented February 21, 1996. 
Title: Oregon's Oil: A Geographic View of Petroleum Distribution and Associated 
Risks 
Since no local crude oil sources exist, every drop of petroleum consumed 
in Oregon originates from outside sources and is distributed multi-modally to consumers. 
As population continues to increase and oil sources dwindle, this reliance may add 
financial and environmental risks to Oregonian' s quality of life. This paper examines 
Oregon's oil distribution system, and analyzes the risks oil movements pose in the state. 
A comprehensive understanding of oil distribution in Oregon can best be gained 
geographically. Pipelines, ships, barges, railroads and trucks play different roles in this 
system, yet data for these transport modes are maintained by different groups and 
unstandardized. Therefore, the data must be normalized to present a map of how oil is 
being moved around the state. This study sets all levels to a barrels (42 U.S. gallons) per 
month (assumed 30 days) standard. 
Oil's role in the economy of our state, most noticeably in the sale of motor 
gasoline, creates different types of risk. The most obvious risk results from 
transportation, and Oregon is plagued daily by unintended releases. A second type of 
risk, supply risk, exists because of our reliance on the petroleum networks of Alaska, 
Washington and California, and was evident during the 1974 oil embargo. Lastly, 
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economic risk should theoretically be present since Oregon is a downstream consumer 
from adjacent states. During times of shortages, Oregon should be at the mercy of those 
who provide its supply. The data do not support this, but suggest that oil is purely a global 
commodity, and price and supply are determined worldwide in response to typical 
marketing forces. 
The distribution systems detailed herein are dynamic, and outside forces such as 
the proposed export of Alaskan crude oil, the increased exploration of offshore oil fields, 
and the development of a cross-Cascades pipeline may alter this scheme. Oregonians can 
ensure the most effective petroleum distribution systems only by understanding them and 
their associated risks. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A comprehensive understanding of how oil is distributed to end users in Oregon 
can best be gained through a geographic view. This study analyzes the oil distribution 
systems within Oregon and evaluates the risks posed by those systems. No study of this 
sort is presently available. Maps depicting the transportation types and corridors provide 
holistic appreciation of how oil gets from its source to consumption. 
This study begins with a look at where we get oil as a nation. Since the United 
States consumes one fourth of the world's petroleum, we must remain cognizant of the 
short and long term supplies. Texas is the major supplier of oil products to the United 
States, and together with Alaska provides one third ofU. S. needs. California, 
Louisiana, and Oklahoma provide the bulk of the remaining domestic supply. Imports, 
which satisfy half of the U.S. petroleum demand, arrive chiefly from Latin America as 
well as the Middle East. 
The study' s focus then shifts to where we get oil as a state. Since the Oil 
Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1974, and the ensuing 
development of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Oregon has remained dependent on Prudhoe 
Bay crude oil to quench its fossil fuel thirst. This Alaskan oil journeys through an 800 
mile pipeline, then into super tankers bound for refineries in Washington and California. 
Since there are no refineries within Oregon, eventually it makes its way here as a 
2 
refined product traveling via pipeline, barge, self propelled vessel, or tank truck. These 
incoming activities function as "inputs" to the state's oil budget. Once in Oregon, oil is 
transported to gas stations, industries, marinas, homes, and many other places that rely 
on petroleum as a source of primary or back up energy. These activities function as 
"movements" to the state's oil budget. 
This thesis quantifies these activities, and includes both volumes and number of 
trips per transport mode. Some modes are readily quantified, while others are more 
challenging. Separate chapters detail the roles performed by pipeline, ships, facilities, 
tank trucks and railroads. The analysis follows the oil to the "tank truck level" of 
detail. The oil is not observed to the ultimate level of a home, gas station, or 
automobile. 
Pipelines, which offer the biggest input, are easily counted, and their volumes 
transported are often available in barrels per hour. Self propelled tank vessels, also 
known as "supertankers," provided our only source of oil several decades ago, but now 
visit Oregon only ten times monthly delivering almost one third of the state's need. 
Tank barges play enormous roles by delivering specialty products from adjacent states, 
providing bunker fuels to awaiting ships, and moving oils within the river system. Tank 
trucks carry the smallest volumes but make by far the most frequent trips. Quantifying 
the transportation patterns of these trucks is difficult, though a 1987 flow study 
conducted by the Public Utility Commission sought to assess the movement of 
hazardous materials within the state. Railroads are the only distribution mode not 
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utilized. Although Oregon enjoys an elaborate rail system servicing many comers of 
the state, rail is not employed in the oil transportation scheme. Reasons for this are 
unclear, but most likely it is a function of the inexpensive alternative of using tank 
trucks. As the population continues to increase, population centers change, or oil prices 
increase, this rail system may figure more prominently in the future. 
Risks, both economic and transportation, are evident in Oregon's oil budget, 
with the transportation risks far more visible than the economic risks. The 
transportation risks are quantified through several sources, and predominantly include 
tank truck, ship and barge mishaps that lead to the spilling of oil. While these affect the 
environment, this study shows that they are too small to influence the overall oil budget. 
Price and supply risk should theoretically be present since Oregon is a 
downstream consumer from adjacent states. During times of shortages or embargoes, 
Oregon should be at the mercy of those who provide its supply. As such, any policies, 
tariffs, or regulations upstream users impose on the oil industry should theoretically be 
passed on to Oregonians in the form of price increases. Data support supply risk but not 
price risk. Rather, data suggest that oil is purely a global market, and its price is 
determined worldwide in response to typical marketing forces such as supply and 
demand. Comparisons of West Coast prices to U.S. prices, as well as comparisons of 
Oregon and Washington prices indicate that Oregon is at no greater economic risk than 
other states during significant "petroleum related events" such as the Exxon Valdez spill 
or the Kuwait oil fires. Like anywhere, when significant petroleum related events 
occur, or there is a perception that they will occur, prices tend to increase. 
GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
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Oil and oil based products play tremendous roles in the economies of the world, 
and particularly the United States. The United States, in 1992, consumed an average of 
17,033,000 barrels per day, representing roughly 25% of the world total of 66,744,000 
barrels per day. This was enough to provide every man, woman and child with 
approximately 3 gallons daily. Japan came in a very distant second place with 
5,454,000 barrels consumed, or less than one third the U. S. total for a per capita rate of 
1.8 gallons per day (Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 
1992, Table 8, January 1994). Further per capita comparisons not shown in this study 
only serve to emphasize the heavy dependence on petroleum by American citizens. 
Fortunately for the U.S., domestic sources of oil do exist. However, these 
reserves are being methodically depleted, and the nation is becoming ever more 
dependent upon outside sources. The following figure indicates there is little if any 
correlation between the amount of petroleum a country consumes and the amount it 
holds in reserves. Such a relationship makes it opportune for oil rich nations to export 
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Figure 1. Geographic disparity between proven crude oil reserves and oil 
consumption based upon 1990 figures (Sources: American Petroleum 
Institute, Basic Petroleum Data Book Vol XIII, No. 3, Section II, Table 
4, 9193, and Energy Information Administration, International Energy 
Annual 1992, Table 8, January 1994). 
This shows the geographic disparity between those that have oil and those that 
need oil. The movement, or distribution, of this oil affects every country and state, 
whether they are on the sending end (and subject to environmental or aggression 
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factors), receiving end (and subject to economic factors), or just on the thoroughfare 
(and perhaps subject to both). 
OREGON OVERVIEW 
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Oregon, much like the United States, is a large consumer of petroleum products 
in relation to its crude reserves. To date, Oregon has yet to establish one proven reserve 
of crude oil, yet it continues to grow in population and increase the disparity between oil 
usage and domestic supply. This increasing gap, with no corresponding domestic 
supply, may increase stresses on the quality of life in Oregon. 
Since no local crude sources exist, every drop of oil consumed in Oregon 
originates from an outside source. This outside source is primarily the Alaska North-
Slope range, and the path the petroleum takes as it makes its way to Oregon consumers 
is anything but direct. The oil is pumped from the earth near the Beaufort Sea, in 42" 
steel piping across three mountain ranges, through the earth, and over permafrost, 
eventually completing its 800 mile journey in Valdez, Alaska. This journey merely 
serves to get oil to a position where it can be transported for refining. Oil in its natural 
form (termed "crude oil") is of little use to consumers until it has been refined. It is 
during the refining process that the raw material is transformed into its various fractions 
that power modem machinery, including everything from lawn mowers to electrical 
generation plants. This refining occurs in neighboring states, but not in Oregon. 
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It is difficult to assess why Oregon has no refineries, however, Oregon is not 
unique in this situation. While the majority of states do contain natural sources of crude 
oil and refineries, densely populated New England is without both. Some states, such as 
Washington, Hawaii, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Georgia, Delaware, and New Jersey, are 
without crude oil but have do have refining capabilities. A few (Florida, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota) have sources of crude oil, but export that oil for refining. 
This is becoming increasingly more important as states adopt taxation schedules such as 
the nickel-per-barrel taxes enacted in Washington, Alaska, and California, which assess 
a five cent tax on every barrel of crude oil entering their state. 
Of states west of the Rocky Mountains, Oregon and Idaho are the only two 
lacking both an oil source and refineries. Idaho has useful neighbors in Montana and 
Utah which boast both substantial oil supplies and refining capability. Oregon, on the 
other hand, has approximately three times the population of Idaho with no such adjacent 
neighbors, as California has tremendous oil thirsts, and Washington must import all of 
its crude. 
Refineries locate in the vicinity of either supplies or markets (Lindsay, 1956), 
and few refineries have been constructed since the 1950s and 1960s. With no major 
population source, no nearby crude supplies, and restricted channel depth of the 
Columbia River, Oregon was understandably bypassed in favor of Puget Sound when 
refineries were constructed in the Northwest. 
CRUDE OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
It has been argued the greatest risk in the oil business is the financial risk to the 
companies that make their livelihood in the industry. Oil exploration and production 
involve risk, which can be simplified into: (1) finding oil; and (2) ensuring that the oil 
is of a quality and quantity demanded by the prevailing market. Such financial risk is 
not quantified in this study, but it does influence the global petroleum market. 
Crude Oil Overview 
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Crude oil on Alaska's North Slope had been identified in the 1960s, but cheap 
imports rendered extraction and production of this source unattractive. Adding to this 
unattractiveness was the engineering challenge of transporting oil from Prudhoe Bay to 
end users in the lower 48 states. Early into the 1974 OPEC price hikes, large oil 
companies with the assistance of the U. S. government, elected to construct a pipeline 
crossing the Brooks Range, the Alaska Range, and the Chugach Mountains. This 
endeavor became the largest engineering feat of the decade, but unfortunately for U. S. 
alternative energy policy, it also overshadowed the development of alternative fuels. 
Like the United States, other nations have adopted efforts to secure supplies of non-
OPEC crude in attempts to minimize their economic vulnerability. Naturally this forces 
OPEC (whose share in world production dropped from 57 % in 1975 to 36% in 1990) to 
examine ways to increase exports (Fellman, 1990). 
Crude oil is a mixture of chemical compounds comprised of hydrogen and 
carbon atoms ("hydrocarbons"), which must be separated to be made useful. The 
unique characteristics of each of these compounds aid in their separation by a 
distillation process. This process takes a batch of crude oil, heats it to a particular 
temperature, and allows a portion to boil off. After awhile the boiling ceases and that 
which has boiled off is collected. The temperature is then increased to the same batch 
of crude until boiling recommences. This boil off is also collected, although separate 
from the first step. The entire process continues, with the temperature applied to the 
crude increased at each step, until only the heaviest product remains. 
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This distillation process (refining) serves to separate the crude at various "cut 
points" corresponding to the temperatures at which they boiled. Although all crude oils 
differ, typical cut points provide products such as: 
90°F propane and butane 
90°F~ 220°F gasoline 
220°F~ 315°F nap th a 
315°F~ 450°F kerosene 
450°F~ 650°F gas oil 
650°F~ 800°F heavy oil 
800°F residue 
These products can be blended, or used directly in the capacity they are needed. 
Based upon the crude oil, large percentages of light, and generally more expensive, 
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products may be distilled. These are referred to as "light crudes" as opposed to "heavy 
crudes" containing a larger percentage of the heavy fractions which supply a greater 
proportion of the residual and gas oils favored by industrial users. Approximately three 
fourths of crude refined in the United States is turned into light distillates such as motor 
gasoline. 
Refinery Overview 
Rather than refine the crude oil in Alaska, then export the finished products, the 
industry prefers to construct refineries near the end user. Like any bulk industry, 
transportation of a uniform product (e.g. crude oil) can be achieved more easily and 
cheaper than transportation of many products (e.g. kerosene, gasoline, and diesel). The 
logistics of separating cargoes and delivering specific cargoes to specific locations can 
increase costs. Furthermore, crude oil supplies from any given locale are finite. 
Therefore, although refineries situated in Alaska may be able to refine crude supplies 
from all over the world, a local market for their output may not always exist. In this 
sense, refineries exploit a particular crude source, and upon its depletion, look for crude 
sources elsewhere to fuel their operations. Should the replacement crude source differ 
substantially from the initial crude source in chemical composition, the refinery adjusts 
to provide the appropriate final products. 
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Distribution Overview 
For off-site refining, crude oil is shipped in large ocean going ships known as 
super tankers. Along the West Coast, these tankers deliver their cargo from Valdez to 
refineries in Southern California, Northern California, and Puget Sound. The Southern 
Californian refineries are centered in Long Beach and import crude supplies from 
Alaska, as well as off the California Coast. The Northern California (San Francisco 
Bay) and Puget Sound refineries are adjusted primarily to accept Alaskan crude. 
Once these crude oils are refined into consumable products, they are distributed 
to the market. This distribution includes the use of self-propelled tankers, barges, 
railroads, trucks, and pipelines in various combinations. Oregon relies on the use of all 
but railroads to distribute bulk petroleum. 
SEARCH FOR CRUDE OIL SOURCES IN OREGON 
With the boom in oil usage in the early 1900s, many states quickly realized that 
securing a stable source of crude would be in their financial interests. Oregon saw 
abundant oil being produced in California and initiated studies to secure a supply of 
crude within its borders. 
Overview 
When searching for petroleum, geologists first look for oil seeps. Since oil is 
generally lighter than water, any underground sources of oil float on the groundwater, 
and have a tendency to make their way to the surface. Oil seeps in any of the petroleum 
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regions of the world have been known of and talked about by local inhabitants centuries 
before the development of petroleum. Seeps in California were known to the Native 
Americans long before the arrival of white and Spanish settlers. 
Given a lack of oil seeps, geologists look for favorable conditions to indicate 
presence of underground petroleum. First, for any region to be productive, it must have 
beds that can be a source of petroleum. Such beds must be porous enough to hold the 
oil and yet when tapped must allow oil to flow to a well. Beds of impervious material 
must overlay this reservoir so as to prevent too much upward movement of the oil. 
Folding of these beds into synclines and anticlines allows petroleum to concentrate in 
the tops of domes, thus easing extraction. 
Oregon Oil Exploration on Land 
Exploration for oil in Oregon began in earnest in 1902, when A.C. Churchill 
drilled two wells near Newberg, and was rewarded with a small flow of non-flammable 
gas. For the following two decades, over 40 wells were drilled, the largest of which was 
in Ontario when gas forced sand and mud to be blown all over the drilling derrick. 
After World War I, another 45 more wells were drilled, none of which produced. 
Following World War 11, and the escalating demand for motor gasoline, major 
companies (Phillips, Richfield, Texaco) began to invest in Oregon. Again, their 
searches revealed no commercially viable quantities (Olmstead, 1989). 
Oil Exploration in Western Ore2on. Geologists formerly believed that Western 
Oregon was largely made of rock formations of similar geologic age to the successful 
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oil districts of Southern California. In 1919, the Oregon Bureau of Mines and Geology 
(now termed the "Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries") 
optimistically commissioned a study to determine oil presence in the western portion of 
the state. 
Four transects were completed from the coast to the Cascade Range to 
determine the geologic structure of the region and predict the potential for oil. Surveys 
were distributed to local residents to determine the presence of natural seeps, which 
would offer quick indications of petroleum. Eaton & Arthur ( 1920) reported a large 
natural seep in the North Fork of the Yamhill River, and found clear oil floating on the 
water's surface. Samples were taken and analyzed to contain 2% foreign matter (water, 
insects, and dead leaves), with the remaining 98% analyzed as kerosene of the 
commercial grade "lantern oil". This seep was apparently either a hoax or Oregon's 
first recorded oil spill. 
The study failed to give any encouragement that Western Oregon would have 
areas in which petroleum exists in commercial quantities. One geologist, Chester 
Washburne, theorized, "As the surface ofrocks of this region are generally saturated 
with circulating groundwater that reaches the surface in the rainy season, it is not 
unreasonable to think that the water has washed out all of the free oil of the rock than 
can be removed by water displacement" (Eaton & Harrison, 1920, p. 25). In other 
words, the heavy precipitation in this region may have washed out any free oil. In 
California, oil regions are not broken by volcanic intrusions as are found in Oregon. 
The lack of satisfactory geologic indications such as confirmed oil seeps, and the 
generally broken conditions of formations, led researchers to dismiss any comparisons 
with Southern California's oil rich terrain. 
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Leasing and drilling increased in the late 1960s and culminated with a 
commercial gas discovery in 1979 near Mist in Columbia County. Subsequent drilling 
resulted in the discovery of additional pools of gas. A pipeline connecting these fields 
to a regional natural gas distribution network was completed by Northwest Natural Gas 
in 1980, and although this was not as valuable as petroleum, it marked the beginning of 
domestic gas production in Oregon. Exploration continues for additional fields in many 
parts of the state, yet viable quantities of petroleum have yet to be found. 
Oil Exploration in Eastern Oregon. A study was conducted in Eastern Oregon 
in the 1920s led by Yale geologist John Buwalda. This plateau region is underlain by 
volcanic rocks in the form of lava flows and interstratified tuff and volcanic ash beds. 
These lavas made their way to the surface from fissures and after their deposition, they 
were warped, folded, and faulted. 
Buwalda examined 15 separate regions of Oregon east of the Cascade range. 
The districts included the Columbia River Gorge, The Dalles, Dufur, Pendleton, John 
Day, Blue Mountains, La Grande, Prineville, Hamey Valley, Beulah, Bend, Klamath 
Falls, Lakeview, SE Oregon, and Ontario. Drilling for oil had already been 
accomplished in the Dalles, Dufur, Bums, Klamath Falls, and Ontario. These wells had 
struck small quantities of gas, but all quickly dissipated. Traces of oil had been reported 
but no verifiable quantities in which crude was brought to the surface existed. 
15 
Buwalda (1921) concluded that Eastern Oregon was also an "improbable" 
source of crude oil. His judgment was based upon the absence of typical oil seeps, the 
freshwater origin of the sedimentary strata, the volcanic nature of rocks underlying the 
sediment, and perhaps most importantly, the many failures to locate oil. 
Oil Exploration Offshore Ore~on 
During the 1960s and 1970s, exploration continued onshore and extended 
offshore for the first time. Major oil companies completed seismic work and elected to 
drill eight offshore wells. In 1964, leases were made for state and federal property off 
Oregon's coast. The eight wells, like their many onshore counterparts, again discovered 
no commercially viable quantities of crude. After several years and $75,000,000, the 
leases were dropped in favor of onshore leases (Olmstead, 1989). 
STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Oil is seldom found where it is consumed. On a global scale, this was 
demonstrated in Figure l of this report. On a nationwide scale, Alaska represents a 
superb demonstration. Having the greatest amount of crude oil reserves (when the 
Arctic National Wildlife refuge is included), Alaska has not only the lowest overall 
consumption, but at 270 stations, also the fewest number of gasoline outlets. Oregon, 
with five times the population, has almost 2000 gas stations and consumes about five 
times more petroleum. Delivering petroleum from the fields to the consumers, or 
source to use, is where distribution becomes important. 
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The following chapters detail this distribution system in Oregon. Pipelines, 
ships, barges, facilities, railroads and trucks all play different roles in this system, yet 
these roles are nowhere clearly articulated. Data for these transport modes are 
maintained by different groups and unstandardized, and hence drive the presentation of 
this report. Pipelines and facilities are stationary components of the system and 
chapters detailing them are largely textual. Ships, barges and trucks are moving 
components of the system and their chapters are primarily graphs. The data for all 
chapters must be normalized to present a useful picture of how oil is being moved 
around the state. This study sets all levels to a barrels (42 U.S. gallons) per month 
(assumed 30 days) standard to allow for meaningful comparisons. 
Data used for this study came from many sources, primarily the federal and state 
governments. For most of the analysis, data for the three year period 1992-94 were used 
as they were not only available and recent, but also provided a convenient comparison 
to data for the 1974 oil embargo. Since Oregon is neither a major population center, nor 
a major market in the petroleum industry, much of the data that is available for other 
states was unavailable for Oregon. 
This study places numbers both on the volumes in each of the processes and the 
frequency of occurrences. Consumption of oil (perhaps termed "outputs") is not 
analyzed. The analysis is conducted around "inputs" and ''movements" of oil, which 
represent the distribution system at work in Oregon. 
CHAPTER II 
OIL PIPELINES IN OREGON 
OVERVIEW 
Pipelines serving Oregon in varying capacities provide the single largest input to 
the oil budget. These include pipelines which import oil from outside the state, 
pipelines which move oil within the state, and a pipeline which passes through the state 
without providing oil. They therefore serve the dual roles of inputs and movements to 
Oregon's oil budget. 
The lack of any east-west oriented mountain ranges in the western portion of 
Oregon aids petroleum distribution. The Willamette Valley provides a flat, stable 
surface with minimal topographic relief for pipelines originating in Puget Sound 
terminating in Portland and Eugene. This network allows for 60% of Oregon's annual 
oil consumption to enter the state and transfer to the many tank farms situated along the 
lower Willamette River. 
For pipelines to figure into Oregon's oil budget, they must bridge the gap 
between supply at one end and demand at the other. For example, the Olympic pipeline 
offers the refined petroleum from the Puget sound region to Portland and the 
surrounding area. The Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline offers a similar service to Eugene. The 
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Chevron Utah pipeline, on the other hand, merely passes through the northeastern 
corner of Oregon without loading or discharging. A summary of the pipelines and their 
characteristics follows: 
TABLE I 
OIL PIPELINES OPERATING IN OREGON 
Petroleum Pipelines Operating in Oregon 
Name Origin Destination Capacity Tanks Storage Products 
Olympic Puget Sound Portland 140000 2 4000 Various 
Santa Fe Pacific Portland Eugene 52200 15 83388 Gas, Diesel 
Chevron Portland PDX Airport 7500 na na Jet fuel 
Kaneb Umatilla Hinkle 10,000 2 52000 diesel 
Chevron Boise Pasco 32000 0 0 Various 
notes: 
Capacity is listed in barrels per day. 
Tank storage is listed in 
barrels. 
The pipelines fill specific niches in the transportation needs of the state. Some 
provide tremendous amounts of product on a continuous basis, while others are used 
only sporadically. 
Olympic Pipeline 
No doubt the largest, and most sophisticated pipeline serving Oregon, the 
Olympic pipeline began initial construction in 1965 to link refineries in the north Puget 
Sound area to bulk oil facilities around Portland. All operations are remotely controlled 
through the Renton control center which operates 24 hours a day. 
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Olympic receives products directly from four refineries--Arco at Cherry Point, 
British Petroleum at Ferndale, and Shell and Texaco at Anacortes. The system consists 
of various size mainlines in its upper stretches, then a 14 inch mainline to complete its 
journey from Renton to Portland. Along its almost 400 mile route, the pipeline supplies 
the cities of Seattle, Tacoma, Tumwater, Vancouver, Linnton, and Portland. The Sea-
Tac Airport also receives product from this line. 
Products are moved through this pipeline at a rate of four miles per hour by 
pumping stations located in the Washington cities of Allen, Woodinville, Renton, 
Spanaway, Vail, and Castle Rock. Once in Oregon, the pipeline supplies many facilities 
with various products including premium gasoline, regular gasoline (leaded and 
unleaded), jet fuel, diesel fuel, and heating oil. In Linnton, deliveries are made from the 
14 inch mainline into tankage owned by GATX. At the Portland Delivery Facility, 
deliveries are made from the 14 inch mainline directly to Arco and Time Oil terminals 
and to Shell, Chevron, Union, McCall and Texaco terminals through manifold valves 
(Olympic Pipeline Spill Contingency Plan, 1993). 
The capacity of this pipeline is 144,000 barrels per day, and it typically operates 
at full capacity (Personal conversation w/ Olympic Pipeline Company, August 1995). 
Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline 
The Portland area reception stations described above also function as delivery 
stations for the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline stretching from Portland to Eugene. Eight 
separate transfer lines (one from each facility) meet at the pipeline's Portland Pump 
Station, where a single eight inch line begins its 115 mile southward journey. 
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Remote control pump stations exist in Fargo, Salem, and Morgan, with 
distribution terminals operating in Albany and Eugene. The capacity of this pipeline is 
52,000 barrels per day, although it more typically averages 35,000 barrels per day, of 
which 2,000 barrels is taken off in Albany (ODOE, 1992). 
Chevron Utah Pipeline 
The Chevron Utah Pipeline, built in 1951, crosses the northeastern comer of 
Oregon on its journey from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Pasco, WA. The crude for this 
pipeline originates in the Rangely Oil Field in northwestern Colorado, and 
approximately 34,000 barrels per day are collected and pumped to the Chevron refinery 
in north Salt Lake. The Salt Lake to Pasco system is comprised of four segments: Salt 
Lake - Boise segment (lines 1 and 2), Pocatello lateral segment, and Boise - Pasco 
segment. 
The Salt Lake - Boise segments run parallel and are distinguished merely by 
their products carried. Line #1 carries diesel fuels, heating oil and jet fuel. Line #2 
carries regular, unleaded, and supreme gasolines. These are both eight inch pipelines 
spanning 320 miles. 
The Pocatello segment similarly consists of an eight inch line traveling 5 5 miles 
from Boise to Pocatello. Oil is stored here by bulk facilities operated by four shippers 
who truck it to local destinations. 
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The Boise - Pasco segment consists of 240 miles of eight inch pipe carrying all 
grades of petroleum products from the Boise storage facilities to the Pasco marine 
terminals. From Adams, OR, to Pasco, the line is looped , which adds an additional 80 
miles of six inch line to the capacity (Chevron Pipeline Prevention Plan, 1993). 
Although this pipeline severs the northeast comer of Oregon from Ontario to 
Pendleton, no product is currently taken off this pipeline in the state. Terminals were 
once located in Baker City and Adams. Because of dwindling demand, the Baker 
terminal has been removed and the Adams terminal has remained unused since 
September, 1990 (ODOE, 1992). 
Chevron Airport Pipeline 
The Chevron Airport Pipeline replaces a railroad depot connection and tank 
truck deliveries that used to provide the jet fuel necessary for airport operation. 
Constructed in 1971, it travels from the Chevron distribution facility in Portland nine 
miles to the Portland International Airport. The pump station consists of a single pump 
with metering facilities, and there are three sets of intermediate control valves for the 
eight inch line (Chevron Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 1993). The daily operation of 
this pipeline moves approximately 5,700 barrels eliminating 24 daily tank truck trips to 
the airport. 
Kaneb Pipeline 
The Kaneb Pipeline Operating Partnership owns a four and a half inch line 
carrying diesel fuel from the Tidewater Barge Lines Umatilla terminal to Union Pacific 
Railroad's yard in Hinkle. Tidewater barges fill the 42,000 barrel tank in Umatilla 
where the diesel is then piped to a 10,000 barrel storage tank owned by the railroad to 
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Fhrnre 2. Locations of pipelines in Oregon. 
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RISK FROM OIL PIPELINES 
Environmental Risk 
Pipelines are often considered the safest mode of petroleum transport when 
evaluating the enormous volumes they move as compared to the number of spills 
occurring. In Oregon this has particularly been true with only one spill over forty two 
gallons reported since 1988. A worldwide view does not paint the same favorable 
picture. Worldwide spill data for 1994 reveals that of the 25 largest releases, I 0 were 
from pipelines. The remaining 15 were from self propelled vessels, barges, and bulk oil 
facilities combined. These pipeline spills are often the result of an outside action such 
as digging, or flooding, as was the case in the many Houston pipeline spills last year. 
However, the 1995 catastrophic pipeline spill in Russia, which has still not been 
quantified, is theorized to be the result of poor engineering and maintenance. 
Oregon is not without its pipeline risk. The Olympic pipeline from Puget Sound 
passes underneath the Columbia River near Sauvie Island, approximately I 00 yards 
from two natural gas pipelines. Although buried to a depth of twelve feet where 
possible, the line is subject to ships anchoring directly above. The area directly above 
this burial is not a designated anchorage. However, vessels prefer it for its wide berth 
and convenience to the many terminals in Portland and Vancouver, and they often 
anchor nearby. Given the combination of the strong Columbia River currents, coupled 
with the sandy substrate, the opportunity for anchors to drag is evident. Such dragging 
could easily damage the pipeline, causing a rupture and subsequent release. Fortunately 
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the pipeline has remotely operated valves from its Renton, Washington, control center 
which could be secured in such an event. However, the valves must be closed 
sequentially, and it takes approximately ten minutes to follow the sequence. At a 
pumping rate of 144,000 barrels per day, the absolute minimum amount of product lost 
from a rupture to this pipeline would allow 42,000 gallons of product to be released. 
The Santa Fe Pacific, Kaneb, and Chevron Airport pipelines also provide 
environmental risk. These lines move significantly smaller quantities of petroleum than 
the Olympic Pipeline, and are not buried in way of ship anchorages. Spills from them 
would most likely result from unauthorized digging or movements of the earth's crust. 
The Chevron Utah pipeline, traversing the northeastern edge of Oregon, presents 
risk with no benefit. The 32,000 barrels per day pumping through this line present an 
exposure to Oregon natural releases, but offer no benefit since all the product is destined 
for Washington. 
Economic Risk 
Petroleum pipelines are regulated federally by the Department of Transportation 
Research and Special Projects Administration (DOT-RSPA). Any changes to these 
regulations would apply universally and consequently place the states on equal footing 
for economic risk. Along the West Coast, state regulations are also enforced for spill 
prevention and response. These regulations require extensive planning, equipment 
purchases and exercising and increase the operating costs of the pipelines. Since the 
federal regulations apply universally, and West Coast states all maintain similar 
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regulations, economic risk is not readily evident. However, since the Olympic pipeline 
provides Oregon with 60% of its needed petroleum, any extended delays in operation 
would have severe economic effects on the oil supply network. 
A proposal has been made to establish a pipeline crossing the North Cascade 
Mountain Range near Ellensburg, Washington, to provide the Pasco, Washington, area 
with petroleum. The present schedule has the pipeline securing necessary permits and 
rights-of-way over the next eighteen months, then completing construction during the 
following year. Initial output of the pipeline is scheduled for 65,000 barrels per day. 
While this pipe does not enter Oregon, it does present ramifications to the shipping 
industry. As described in the following chapter, 65 barge trips upriver to Pasco occur 
monthly. These trips will all but be eliminated by the construction and operation of the 
pipeline, which will significantly hamper the economic viability of the Columbia River 
petroleum barging industry. Not as readily apparent, but also a threat, will be the 
ramifications to the tank vessels calling on Portland. As the cross Cascades pipeline 
goes into operation, it will free up capacity of the existing Olympic pipeline by allowing 
product to be transported directly to Pasco, rather than to Portland and then to Pasco. 
This change allows Olympic to send more Portland-destined product through the 
existing pipeline, which will reduce the need for outside shipments. 
Given the global nature of the petroleum industry, these pipeline developments 
will most likely not be offset by a price decrease for petroleum users in the Pasco area. 
Therefore, the economic risk primarily takes the form of lost jobs with the decline of the 
upriver petroleum barging fleet. 
CHAPTER III 
SHIPPING IN OREGON 
OVERVIEW 
Large quantities of oil are moved by vessels in Oregon's waters, which includes 
both self propelled and non-self propelled (barge) vessels. These watercraft function in 
the roles of both inputs and movements to the distribution system. Oregon does not 
receive the crude-carrying super tankers similar to the familiar Exxon Valdez, but 
instead receives much smaller vessels carrying refined products from Puget Sound, 
Northern California, and Southern California. 
The Columbia River, with its dredged depth of 40' limits the size of oil tankers 
desiring entrance, and necessitates the use of smaller tankers which transport products 
from refineries in Puget Sound or Northern California. The riverbed is primarily sandy 
which allows for the occasional tanker grounding without the risk of catastrophic spills. 
On the coast, deepwater ports exist in Coos Bay and Y aquina Bay. Coos Bay 
uses this capability to perform the role of petroleum distribution hub within its region, 
and is served by large oceangoing tank barges entering two to three times monthly. 
Yaquina Bay has failed to secure any waterborne oil distribution service, and uses its 
deepwater port capability to receive occasional lumber ships. 
28 
The basaltic Cascade Mountain Range cuts a north-south boundary dividing the 
western one third of Oregon and Washington from their remaining portions to the east. 
Crossing this range has historically been treacherous, and were it not for the presence of 
the Columbia River Gorge, oil transport and distribution would be significantly 
hampered. The Gorge serves as the only sea level east-west crossing of the Cascade 
Range, and as such it has enabled barge traffic to supply the inland portions of Oregon 
with needed petroleum. Other river limitations include the presence of the Oregon City 
Falls, located near West Linn on the Willamette. These falls prevent commercial 
vessels from provisioning upriver portions of the Willamette. 
Typically, the super tankers carrying crude oil travel from Valdez, Alaska, to 
one of the three destinations mentioned above for refining. Following the refining 
process, smaller product-carrying tankers move the oil up and down our west coast to 
the distribution facilities. Far smaller than the 1,000,000 barrels carried in the super 
tankers, these coastal tankers typically hold 300,000 barrels since the depth of the 
Columbia River (maintained to 40 feet) does not allow tankers of greater size to enter. 
Occasionally super tankers in need of repair enter the Columbia to proceed to the Swan 
Island Ship Repair yard, but do so very carefully in an unloaded condition. 
Oil moved into Oregon on barges is done on large ocean going barges, which 
can often load 75,000 barrels. These barges typically move heavy fuel oils since such 
products cannot be transferred by the Olympic pipeline. Once oil is to be distributed 
inside the river system, it is transferred to other smaller barges. Such barges average 
15,000 barrels capacity for those used to transfer propulsion fuels to awaiting vessels 
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and 40,000 to 50,000 barrels capacity for those used to transfer from facility to facility. 
The distinction between these transportation patterns is discussed later. 
SELF PROPELLED TANKERS 
The self propelled tankers function as an input to Oregon's oil budget. These 
tankers generally operate in a "liner route," meaning they routinely travel between 
scheduled ports. Occasionally, "tramp" tankers, which operate whenever they can find 
a job, visit Oregon, although not as frequently as the liner trade. 
The tankers calling on the Columbia River and the coast travel between 
refineries in California and Washington to deliver products. Those coming from 
California supplement the minute amount of products imported via truck from the south. 
Those coming from Washington augment the majority of product input which flows 
from the Olympic Pipeline. On rare occasions, a crude carrying tanker visits from 
South America to supply stock to the asphalt plants operated by Chevron Products 
Company on the lower Willamette River. 
As the following graph depicts, tanker visits to Oregon average roughly ten 
monthly, all to the Columbia River area. Self propelled tankers have not called upon 
Coos Bay since August 1993. This corresponded with the implementation of federal 
response requirements which were followed the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990, an amendment to the Clean Water Act. These requirements necessitated the 
purchase and maintenance of oil spill recovery equipment in Coos Bay. Rather than 
fund such a response organization, industry elected to cease deliveries by self propelled 
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Figure 3. Destination of self propelled oil tankers in Oregon 1992-94. 
Coos Bay has not received a tanker since the implementation of the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (Source: DEQ vessel movement data 1992-94 ). 
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Based upon these 10 monthly visits, average tanker traffic to the Columbia River 
equals approximately 100,000 barrels daily, as compared to almost 200,000 barrels 
daily from the Olympic Pipeline. However, the speed with which oil is moved by these 
vessels, while slow, is about three times that of the pipeline. 
OIL BARGES 
Barges function as both inputs and movements to Oregon's oil budget. Large 
oceangoing barges move products into the state's waters. Hauling smaller specialty 
shipments that would not warrant a full self propelled tanker, these barges routinely 
travel from ports in northern and southern California, as well as Puget Sound. Oil 
budget movements are accomplished by barges that operate entirely within the river 
system and are not engaged in a coastwise trade. 
Oil Inputs by Ban~e 
Barges providing inputs to Oregon are generally large ocean going barges 
operated by one of five barge companies, all of which are headquartered on the West 
Coast. Although the origin of these barge trips fluctuates over time, overall they are 
split evenly between Oregon and Washington. 
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Fi~ure 4. Origin of oil barge inputs to Oregon. Refined products are 
moved from Washington and California into Oregon ports (Source: 
DEQ vessel movement data 1992-1994 ). 
An examination of the percentages gives a clearer picture of the fluctuations 
between California and Washington originated shipments. 
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Fi~ure 5. Origin of oil barges entering Oregon waters 1992-94 (Source: 
DEQ vessel movement data 1992-1994). 
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More predictable than the origin of these barges, is the cycle they follow in their 
deliveries shown in the following graph. The majority of vessels calling on the 
Columbia River versus Coos Bay obviously corresponds to the demand of these two 
geographic areas. On a monthly average, Coos Bay receives just 33,000 barrels of oil 
by barge, while the Columbia River receives 240,000 barrels (U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Waterborne Commerce User Statistics, 1993). 
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Fi~ure 6. Destination of oil barges entering Oregon waters 1992-94 
(Source: DEQ Vessel Movement Data 1992-1994 ). 
A comparison of the "Origin" and "Destination" information reveals that Coos 
Bay receives 79% of its barge shipments from Washington, 7% from California, and 
14% from the Columbia River. The Columbia River, on the other hand, receives 48% 
of its barge shipments from Washington and 52% from California. This is curious 
considering geographically Coos Bay is closer to California than is the Columbia River. 
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The primary explanation for Coos Bay's traffic is one of contractual arrangements. 
Coos Bay facilities have a business relationship with oil suppliers in Puget Sound, and 
therefore originate their shipments in Washington. While this ensures Coos Bay a 
reliable source of oil, it renders them more vulnerable, and hence at greater risk, to 
Washington energy policies and availability than is the Columbia River. 
Oil Movements by Barge 
Once oil is within Oregon, it is transported through the Columbia River system 
by various barge fleets. This transport generally serves two purposes: to move product 
from one facility to another, and to move product from a facility to an awaiting ship. In 
Coos Bay, very few movements occur. Once product is at the facilities, it generally is 
moved to tank trucks for distribution. In the Portland area, the movements are more 
complex as product is moved upriver to supply the upper Columbia and Snake Rivers' 
needs, and downriver to supply commercial ships needing propulsion fuel. 
Upriver movements exist to provide oil supplies to facilities lying outside the 
Portland metropolitan area. Oil distribution facilities exist in Umatilla, Oregon, Tri-
Cities, Washington, and Clarkston, Washington, and use this barged oil to supply parts 
of eastern Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. 
Historically, mariners brought oil barges upriver to supply these facilities, and 
grain barges downriver to supply the silos on the lower Columbia. Such trade routes 
necessitated an empty load at least one direction since grain and petroleum could not be 
loaded into the same tanks. Eventually, a combination barge was developed by local 
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shippers that allowed oil to be carried in lower tanks during the upriver transit, and then 
grain to be carried in an upper hopper during the downriver transit. Such an 
arrangement allowed the barge to maintain earning capacity during a round trip journey, 
and served to keep prices of both commodities low. 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, 
requires oil barges to be fitted with double hulls. This requires an inner hull that carries 
the oil, and an outer hull that serves as a void space between the vessel and the water. 
This requirement has rendered the combination barge, which efficiently served the 
Columbia River since the 1950s, unfeasible. Therefore, combination barges are 
methodically being replaced by large double hulled oil barges to move petroleum 
upriver, and hopper-configured barges to move grain downriver. 
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Figure 7. Upriver destinations for barges departing from Portland 1992-
1994. These movements supplement the oil flowing to these locations 
through the Chevron-Utah pipeline (Source: DEQ Vessel Movement 
Data 1992-1994 ). 
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On average, this represents 65-70 trips per month, or more than two daily. The 
majority of trips are from Portland to Pasco, although about one trip occurs from 
Portland to Umatilla every two days, which has one oil distribution facility serving 
trucks and rail. The rail segment of this facility consists of a pipeline feeding a 10,000 
gallon storage tank at the Hinkle rail yard. The remainder of the product stays at a tank 
farm for eventual distribution via truck. Barge trips to Pasco supply the Chevron and 
Tidewater tank farms, which also receive inputs from the Chevron Utah pipeline 
described earlier. 
Occasionally barges move from Pasco downriver to the Portland area. These 
barges transport products from the Chevron pipeline-supplied facilities and provide 
them to the Portland facilities. Shipments such as these usually occur because of the 
need for specialized products only available through the Chevron pipeline, although, 
occasionally these shipments occur because of price differentials between the Chevron 
Pipeline and the petroleum supplies coming in to Portland (Personal communication 
with Tidewater Barge Lines, March 1995). 
Barges also provide "bunker" fuel to ships visiting Oregon's waters. 
"Bunkering" is an historical term derived from large coal storage compartments known 
as ''bunkers" on early powered ships. Today the term generally refers to the refueling 
process on self propelled vessels. Ships receiving bunkers play a significant role as a 
"movement out of state" to Oregon's oil budget. This role is primarily limited to heavy 
fuels, which are less costly, have high BTU (British Thermal Units), and are burned in 
ships' boilers or engines. 
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In Oregon, ships receive bunker fuel either in Coos Bay or the Columbia River. 
Yaquina Bay, although a deep draft port, does not have the facilities to support a 
bunkering operation. Therefore, cargo ships calling on Yaquina Bay must also visit 
other ports to refuel. In Coos Bay, approximately three vessels receive bunker fuels 
monthly, and this has fluctuated over time. In recent years, the Columbia River has 
experienced a significant decline in vessels receiving fuel. 
The 1992, 1993, and 1994 monthly average number of vessels receiving fuel 
were 100, 85, and 75 respectively. Considering each vessel receives 6,761 barrels of 
fuel, the decline represents a significant alteration to the overall oil budget. The number 
of vessels receiving bunkers appear independent of the overall trend of ships visiting the 
Columbia River, which has remained relatively unchanged, and perhaps slightly 
increased, over time. Data from 1992-94 indicate that the average number of vessels 
calling on the Columbia River has remained steady at 170 per month. Therefore, rather 
than the 58% of vessels receiving bunkers in 1992, we presently experience only 44%. 
The 25 vessels not receiving fuel represents 169 ,025 barrels, or 7 ,099 ,050 gallons of 
fuel monthly. At $.80 per gallon, this amounts to $5,679,240 monthly. Industry 
reasons for this decline generally point to heightened regulatory oversight on such 
operations. However, Oregon has no specific rules pertaining to the receiving or 
delivering of bunker fuels which would serve to increase their cost. The environmental 
will of the public is strong, however, and spills from ships receiving fuel are not 
tolerated. Therefore, this risk perception may be enough to deter ships from loading 
.. 
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bunkers. The availability of low cost fuels in Singapore and Mexico probably cuts into 
the Columbia River's market more than any environmental issue. 
Despite this, it is interesting to note the healthy role Oregon does play in vessel 
bunkering. Nationwide figures from 1992 indicate that Oregon ranks a respectable 
seventh in states providing bunkers to vessels with 289,667,000 gallons (6,896,833 
barrels) transferred. This follows the other west coast states with California leading the 
nation at 1,463,396,000 gallons (34,842,762 barrels) and Washington at 1,038,944,000 
gallons (24,736,760 barrels) (National Petroleum News, Mid-June 1994). California 
and Washington both have huge shipping ports. By comparison, Oregon receives a 
small number of ship visits and ranked just twenty-second in total ship activity for 1993. 
California ranked third and fifth respectively (U.S. Army Corps, Waterborne 
Commerce User Statistics 1993). Therefore, compared to other states, Oregon barge 
and oil companies are seizing the opportunity to provide bunkering services to a large 
percentage of the commercial vessel traffic. 
In Coos Bay, vessels receiving fuels do so at any terminal they are berthed. 
Along the Columbia River, vessels receiving bunker fuels do so at three principal 
stretches. These geographic locations are Astoria, Longview, PortlandN ancouver. 
Vessels receive the bunker fuels at these locations because they must either be moored 
or at anchor prior to receiving fuels, and these locations provide such services. Given 
the choice, vessels prefer to conduct bunkering at anchor since it saves them from 
having to pay additional moorage fees. 
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Generally, the receipt of fuels takes a secondary role to the transfer of cargo, 
therefore, vessels prefer to take care of cargo operations, then move to anchor to load 
bunkers. Since PortlandN ancouver is the largest loading port, it has the 
correspondingly highest bunker activity, followed by Longview and eventually Astoria. 
Portland has no anchorages due to the constricted channel in the Willamette, therefore, 
all vessels bunkering in Portland do so at a terminal following cargo operations. The 
chart below depicts the locations vessels receive bunker fuels, which functions as a 




















Fi~ure 8. Locations of vessels receiving bunkers monthly average 1992-
1994. Most bunkering is completed in the PortlandN ancouver area for 
convenience and cost savings (Source: DEQ Vessel Movement Data 
1992-1994). 
While all vessels receiving bunker fuels represent a movement of oil, it is 
apparent that significant differences exist in where they receive those fuels. Such 
differences may not signify a critical element of the oil budget, but they off er 
information on the environmental risk involved per location, and the economic 
importance of various locations along the Columbia River. 
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RISK FROM SHIPPING 
Environmental Risk 
The environmental risk from shipping manifests itself in the form of spills 
subsequent to groundings, collisions, and transfer operations. Oregon's largest historic 
spills have all been from vessels. The first major waterborne spill was the 1978 
grounding of the Motor Vessel (MN) Toyota Maru who punctured a fuel tank on the 
lower Willamette River with the ship's anchor. This mishap allowed over 30,000 
gallons of heavy fuel to spill. Following this was the grounding of the MN Blue 
Magpie on north jetty of Yaquina Bay during a storm in 1983. This grounding not only 
led to the complete loss of the Blue Magpie, but allowed 80,000 gallons of mixed fuel 
products to damage Newport's beaches. The largest spill in Oregon history was the 
grounding of the self propelled tank vessel Mobil Oil, which in 1984, ran aground on 
Warrior Rock at Sauvie's Island's downstream tip. This navigation error caused the loss 
of 225,000 gallons of mixed petroleum products to damage the fragile Columbia River. 
Perhaps more frustrating is the effect that offshore shipping may have on 
Oregon's environment without even entering the state's territorial sea. Tar balls 
routinely wash up on Oregon beaches that are most likely a result of passing ships 
cleaning tanks or pumping bilges far out to sea. Such crimes are difficult, if not 
impossible to prosecute, as the opportunity to catch such vessels is limited to 
crewmember confessions. Also problematic are spills occurring elsewhere that are 
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brought to Oregon because of the nearshore current. Fallowing the 1991 Motor Vessel 
Tenyo Maru collision off Vancouver, B. C., oil washed up as far south as Lincoln City, 
and response crews hastily worked to remove debris before it could become 
contaminated as well. 
On average, Oregon experiences one large waterborne distribution related spill 
annually. Two relatively identical spills occurred almost six months apart in 1993 and 
1994. The spills both resulted from bunkering mishaps involving a domestic barge line 
and foreign bulk cargo ships. The first spill involved the Motor Vessel Central and 
occurred the morning of June 3, 1993. The second spill involved the Motor Vessel An 
Ping 6 and occurred the morning of January 10, 1994. Cleanup for the M/V Central 
lasted three days, as opposed to cleanup for the MN An Ping 6 which lasted 30 days. 
The remarkable difference in the cleanup time required for the spills can be attributed to 
the large variability in river discharge. The MN Central spill occurring in early June 
with a river discharge of 325,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) stayed largely in the main 
channel of the river, avoided large portions of the shoreline, and proceeded downstream 
with the current. Consequently the cleanup lasted only three days. The MN An Ping 6 
spill, occurring under identical circumstances except sixth months later with a river 
discharge of 120,000 cfs, severely polluted the Washington shoreline, required a month 
long cleanup and cost significantly more in response. Property claims, although 
presently unavailable in detailed form, suggest far greater damages from the MN An 
Ping 6 spill as well. The "large spill" for 1995 occurred on August 5, and involved 
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2000 gallons of heavy fuel oil being transferred from a barge to an awaiting ship on the 
lower Willamette. 
Economic Risk 
Economic risk from vessels is evident in the lack of control Oregon has over the 
international nature of the shipping industry. In addition to the economic risk from 
reduced bunkering described earlier, many ships visiting Oregon travel from all over the 
world, and are subject to a variety of regulatory regimes. For example, ship operations 
are influenced by their flag state, or nation issuing their certification, the port state, in 
this case the United States, international maritime rules, and local rules. Therefore, a 
tanker visiting Oregon from Washington not only must comply with flag state, port 
state, and international regulations, it must also comply with Washington state tanker 
regulations. Washington State is presently being sued by the International Tanker 
Owners Association (INTERTANKO) for establishing tanker regulations in excess of 
federal regulation. One ramification of such regulation is the increased cost of 
compliance, which is ultimately passed on to the consumer. 
California likewise has tanker regulations which could economically affect 
Oregon. Tankers wishing to load products in California (and potentially bound for 
Oregon) are required to deploy oil spill containment boom prior to conducting 
operations. Such regulations, not federally regulated, make the cost of compliance in 
California more expensive. These costs, much like those experienced by tankers 
passing through Washington waters, increase the ultimate cost of such products to 
consumers in Oregon. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BULK OIL FACILITIES IN OREGON 
OVERVIEW 
Bulk oil facilities are the distribution hubs within Oregon's oil budget. 
Functioning neither as inputs nor movements, they receive products from a source, store 
or blend the products, and distribute them. There are a few facilities, such as pulp and 
paper mills or energy facilities, that also receive bulk products, but use them entirely 
without distribution. These facilities function as merely oil consumers and are not part 
of the distribution system, 
As discussed in previous chapters, a typical bulk distribution facility receives its 
supply by self propelled tanker, oceangoing barge or pipeline, then distributes that 
supply by tank truck, river barge or pipeline. 
The lower Willamette River plays home to the majority of bulk facilities in 
Oregon. These facilities include companies in the business of distributing oil, pulp and 
paper mills receiving heavy fuel oil, and an asphalt refinery. For our purposes, those 
involved in the transportation of oil are the most pertinent and have the greatest affect 
on Oregon's oil distribution. 
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General Relationships 
The "input" pipeline to these facilities is the Olympic pipeline from Puget Sound 
which supplies them with an average of 6000 barrels of light distillates per hour. The 
inputs coming from tankers and barges often carry heavier products that cannot be 
pumped through the pipeline. The "movement" pipelines are the Chevron Airport 
pipeline and the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline to Eugene which are discussed earlier. 
Product not transferred to these pipelines is distributed either by tank trucks to places 
such as gas stations, or by barges to ships and other facilities. River barges generally 
carry light products up the Columbia River to replenish facilities located in Umatilla, 
Pasco, and Clarkston, and bunker barges haul heavy products to ships moored or 
anchored in the lower Columbia and Willamette Rivers. Details of these distributions 
are available in the barge section of Chapter IV. 
Aside from the Columbia/Willamette River system, two facilities serve 
Oregon's coast and are located in Coos Bay. One of these facilities stores only heavy 
fuels to replenish visiting ships and provide local lumber mills with industrial fuels. 
The other facility receives lighter products by barge and distributes them through tank 
trucks to gas stations and homes throughout southwestern Oregon. 
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TABLE II 
BULK OIL FACILITIES RECEIVING IMPORTS IN OREGON 
Facility Location City Tanks Volume Products 
ARCO Willamette RM 5 Linnton 29 582,831 Gas, Diesel 
Boise Cascade Multnomah chnl St. Helens 1 400,000 Fuel Oil 
Chevron Willamette RM 8 Portland 179 1,518,146 Gas, Dsl, Jet 
Chevron Asphalt Willamette RM 8 Portland 104 1,426,464 Charge Stock 
GATX Willamette RM 5 Linnton 34 484,000 Gas, Diesel 
GATX (ex "Shell'') Willamette RM 8 Portland 164 616,607 Gas, Diesel 
James River Columbia RM 42 Wauna 1 40,000 Fuel Oil 
McCall Columbia RM 13 Astoria 4 100,500 Diesel 
McCall Willamette Portland 25 956,150 Gas, Diesel 
Mobil Willamette RM 5 Linn ton 106 267 Gas, Lube 
Newport Petroleum Coos RM 12 Coos Bay 11 66,600 Gas, Diesel 
Owens Corning Willamette RM 4 Linnton 7 91,710 Asphalt 
Pacific Northern Willamette RM 6 Linnton 5 270,000 Gas, Diesel 
Portland Gen'/ Columbia RM 52 Clatskanie JO 1,298,000 Diesel 
Electric 
Port of Portland Willamette RM 8 Portland 15 155, 722 Fuel Oil 
Texaco Willamette RM 9 Portland 16 424,770 Gas, Diesel 
Tidewater Columbia RM 283 Umatilla 24 207,809 Gas 
Time Oil Willamette RM 3 St. Johns 33 742,876 Gas, Diesel 
Time Oil Willamette RM 5 Linn ton 11 319,968 Gas, Diesel 
Unocal Willamette RM 8 Portland 26 870,379 Gas, Dsl, Jet 
Unocal Coos RM 13 Coos Bay 12 124,862 Gas, Diesel 
notes: 
"RM" is river mile, measured from the river's mouth upstream to 
source. 
"Tanks" is the total number of aboveground storage tanks. 
Total volumes are listed in barrels. 1 barrel = 42 gallons. 
Facilities that are italicized are receptors only of water transported bulk petroleum, not 
distribution hubs. 
Sources: Oil Spill Contingency Plans for facilities in Oregon. 
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Distribution Facilities 
Distribution facilities are operated by oil companies in the business of 
transporting petroleum products. Such facilities, also called tank farms, consist of 
extensive above ground storage tanks, and associated piping and pumps to move the 
product. A large berm surrounds these tanks and acts as containment should failures 
occur. Generally these facilities offload to truck racks, or a large filling station, where 
tank trucks move the fuel to its final destination. These facilities may also offload to 
barges or other pipelines for long distance shipments. 
Reception Facilities 
Facilities that receive products only for their own use are reception facilities. 
These are not owned by oil companies, and are typically large industries such as wood 
products, paper mills, or electrical generation plants needing vast quantities of 
petroleum. These industries may have enormous storage capacities in some cases. The 
Portland General Electric generation facility located in Clatskanie has 1.3 million 
barrels of diesel fuel kept on reserve should their normal supply of natural gas become 
interrupted (Personal communication with PGE facility, March 1995). Such facilities 
receive their products by barge alone, since they are not serviced by pipelines, have fuel 
needs too big for tank trucks, and are incapable of receiving self propelled tank ships. 
Amounts of petroleum delivered to these facilities is therefore accounted for under 
"Barge Movements." 
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Fhrnre 9. Oil facilities located on the lower Willamette River. 
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RISK FROM BULK OIL FACILITIES 
Environmental Risk 
Tremendous environmental risk exists in the bulk oil facilities since they 
represent enormous volumes of petroleum storage in a localized area of the state, and 
the failure of any one of them could have severe environmental ramifications. For 
example, the Chevron distribution facility has a storage capacity of 63,000,000 gallons 
and a catastrophic failure could result in a spill six times as large as the Exxon Valdez. 
This risk is made slightly more apparent by the age and location of the facilities 
along the lower Willamette River. Many of these facilities have tanks still in use that 
were constructed in the 1920s, some of which were built prior to the perfection of 
welding technology. Therefore, they are either riveted, or crudely welded, both of 
which are susceptible to failure. More importantly, these tank farms are situated on a 
portion of the Willamette consisting largely of landfill including sandy dredge spoils, 
sawdust, and any other materials early industrialists saw fit to fill in the many "swamps" 
bounding the Willamette. Such fill is prone to liquefaction during earthquakes, and 
could ultimately lead to total tank failure. The Oregon Emergency Response System 
routinely employs this possibility in their annual earthquake exercise. 
Operational spills from these facilities are rare since they function as merely 
storage receptacles and have few moving parts. A local facility did experience a 5000 
gallon heavy fuel oil release November 3, 1995, following the failure of relief valve 
piping. This spill was contained entirely within the bermed area around the tanks and 
was quickly remediated. 
Economic Risk 
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These facilities merely function as distribution hubs within the petroleum system 
and have no bearing on how much oil is brought into or used by the state. Since these 
facilities all lie within Oregon, and are subject to laws administered by the state, we 
experience little economic risk. Any changes to their costs of compliance will either be 
as a result of federal regulations, which would apply to every state, or state regulation, 
which would be self imposed. Therefo~e, unlike pipelines and vessels described earlier, 
economic risks from facilities, while possible, are largely within the control of Oregon. 
CHAPTER V 
OIL MOVEMENTS BY TANK TRUCK 
OVERVIEW 
Oil movements by truck serve as inputs, and movements to Oregon's oil budget. 
Inputs include those tank trucks bringing oil into the state from an outside source. 
Movements include the many trucks loading petroleum at the bulk facilities mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Quantifying the movements of these tank trucks to compare 
them to the other portions of the distribution system is difficult. Much of the data 
presented comes from a 1987 flow study (Oregon Public Utilities Commission, 1987). 
This flow study was conducted by the Public Utility Commission of Oregon and 
the Oregon Department of Transportation in response to recommendations put forth by 
the Oregon Interagency Hazard Communication Council. The Hazard Communication 
Council's report proposed the need to quantify the level ofrisk to Oregon's citizens. 
The study's intent, therefore, was to provide information regarding the number and type 
of hazardous materials transported on Oregon highways. 
To conduct the study, information from the movement of hazardous materials 
was gathered at eleven truck weigh scales. The locations included five scales on 
Interstates 5 and 84, three on U.S. highways and three on state routes. In surveying the 
truck movements, personnel stopped hazard placarded trucks, and examined shipping 
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papers for each specific material's name, identification number, quantity, container 
type, origin, destination, and routes traveled. The primary materials identified during 
the survey included petroleum products, hazardous wastes, sodium hydroxide, paints, 
and cleaning compounds. Only the shipments of petroleum products have been 
analyzed for the purposes of this research. 
The survey was conducted in three phases, with the shipments assessed over a 
three day period for each phase. 
Movements Within the State 
Phase I of the survey, which provides information on movements, included 
assessing vehicles passing by the following weigh scales: 
Scale Roadway Direction of Travel 
Woodburn 1-5 South 
Wyeth 1-84 East 
Scappoose US30 West 
Brightwood US26 East 
Dayton SR99W South 
Hubbard SR99E South 
Tillamook SR6 West 
At each site, the survey of movements was conducted for 72 hours. In this 
initial phase, the survey was conducted on March 9-11, 1987, at Wyeth (I-84 
Eastbound), Scappoose (US30 Westbound), and Dayton (SR99W Southbound). On 
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March 16-18, 1987, the survey was conducted at Woodburn (15 Southbound), Hubbard 
(SR99W Southbound), Brightwood (US26 Eastbound), and Tillamook (SR6 
Westbound). During Phase II, the same survey was repeated, only later in the year. The 
March 9-11 survey sites (Wyeth, Scappoose, Dayton) were examined on August 3-5, 
1987. The March 16-18 sites (Woodburn, Hubbard, Brightwood, Tillamook) were 
examined on August 10-12, 1987. The number of trips, the products transported, and 
the locations examined are identified in the following table. 
TABLE III 
MONITORING STATIONS FOR OIL MOVEMENTS IN ST ATE 
Station Gasoline Flam Av Diesel Comb 
NOS Gas NOS 
Wyeth Trips 43 3 1 23 3 
Eastbound Vol 8429 1284 5117 6759 6422 
Total 362447 3852 5117 1554576 19266 
Scappoose Trips 48 2 26 
Westbound Vol 9015 12780 7246 
Total 432720 25560 0 188396 0 
Brightwood Trips 53 36 9 
Eastbound Vol 8065 6276 6000 
Total 427445 0 0 225936 54000 
Dayton Trips 33 22 1 
Southbound Vol 8041 6325 8500 
Total 265353 0 0 139150 
Hubbard Trips 16 11 1 
Southbound Vol 7331 5937 6000 
Total 117296 0 0 65307 6000 
Tillamook Trips 9 4 
Westbound Vol 9894 6992 
Total 89046 0 0 27968 0 
Woodburn Trips 126 7 4 69 8 
Southbound Vol 9223 8580 9968 7466 6386 
Total 1162098 60060 39872 515154 51088 
Source: Public Utility Commission, 1987 
Notes: "Flam NOS" is flammable cargo not otherwise specified. 
"A vGas" is Aviation Gasoline. 
"Comb NOS" is combustible cargo not otherwise specified. 

























To assess the total petroleum related products moved through these survey sites 
during a three day period, the information may be summarized as follows: 
TABLE IV 
TRUCK MOVEMENT SUMMARY TABLE 
Location Trips Volume in Gallons Volume/Trip 
Wyeth 73 546139 7481 
Scappoose 76 646676 8508 
Brightwood 98 707381 7218 
Dayton 56 413003 7375 
Hubbard 28 188603 6735 
Tillamook 13 117014 9001 
Woodburn 214 1828272 8543 
T otal/3 days 558 4447088 7969 
These figures represent the average of two surveys, each conducted over a three 
day period. The volume per trip figure is computed to offer an increased understanding 
of the risk presented per truck. This runs from a low of 6735 gallons for trucks 
traveling through Hubbard, to a high of 9001 for trucks in Tillamook. Therefore, to 
obtain a monthly projection comparable to the pipeline, vessel and barge data, the 
figures were multiplied by ten (10) and converted to barrels. 
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TABLEV 
TRUCK MOVEMENT MONTHLY PROJECTIONS 
Location Trips Volume Volume/Trip Volume Bbls 
Wyeth 730 5,461,390 7,481 130,033 
Scappoose 760 6,466,760 8,509 153,970 
Brightwood 980 7,073,810 7,218 168,424 
Dayton 560 4,130,030 7,375 98,334 
Hubbard 280 1,886,030 6,736 44,905 
Tillamook 130 1,170,140 9,001 27,860 
Woodburn 2,140 18,282,720 8,543 435,303 
Total/month 5,580 44,470,880 7,970 1,058,830 
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Figure 10. Monthly projection of tank truck movements in Oregon. 
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It is clearly seen that the majority of movement occurs on 15 southbound through 
Woodburn. The 2140 trips more than doubles the 980 moving through the next busiest 
station in Brightwood. This represents the tank trucks that are transporting products 
from the Portland area bulk facilities throughout the rest of the metropolitan region. 
However, this figure does not represent the many tank trucks moving products within 
the metropolitan region, as many of those vehicles may travel inside the area bounded 
by Woodburn, and the adjacent weigh stations. Therefore, the study fails to accurately 
assess the amount of trips moving within the Portland region. Estimates for this amount 
are made in Chapter VII. 
Movements into the State 
Phase III of the study was completed to assess hazardous material movements 
entering Oregon from adjacent states. This phase utilized port of entry scales in the 
following locations: 
Station Roadway Direction of Travel 
Ashland 15 North 
Klamath Falls US97 North 
Ontario 184 East 
Ostrander, WA 15 South 
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Surveys at these sites were conducted November 17-19. The Ashland and 
Klamath Falls sites were chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from California and 
Nevada. The Ontario site was chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from Idaho. The 
Ostrander, WA, site was chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from Washington. 
These sites were not without their limitations. The Ashland, Klamath Falls, and 
Ontario sites are all located some distance within the Oregon border. Therefore, surveys 
conducted here excluded shipments terminating in locations prior to the weigh station. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the Klamath Falls survey station assessed 
traffic movements from Nevada since US97 leads from northern California into Oregon. 
The Ostrander, WA, site was also not without its shortcomings. It is located 50 miles 
north of Portland, as well as north of Kelso and Longview, WA. Therefore, shipments 
originating in these cities, both of which maintain bulk oil and chemical facilities, 
would not be included in the study. 
Surveys conducted led to the following data: 
TABLE VI 
MONITORING STATIONS FOR OIL INPUTS INTO OREGON 
Station Gasoline Flam Av Gas Diesel 
NOS 
Klamath Falls Trips 2 5 
Northbound Vol 4806 3030 
Total 9612 0 0 15150 
Ontario Trips 3 1 2 
Westbound Vol 4018 6000 8100 
Total 12054 6000 0 16200 
Ostrander, WA Trips 5 3 14 
Southbound Vol 10696 6475 10005 
Total 53480 19425 140070 
Ashland Trips 17 19 13 
Northbound Vol 7544 4878 6299 
Total 128248 92682 0 81887 
Source: Public Utility Commission, 1987 
Notes: "Flam NOS" is flammable cargo not otherwise specified. 















"Comb NOS" is combustible cargo not otherwise specified. 















Since only one period of three days was used, no averaging was conducted when 




TRUCK INPUT SUMMARY TABLE 
Location Trips Volume in gals Volume/Trip 
Klamath Falls 8 28162 3520 
Ontario 8 47916 5990 
Ostrander 25 233633 9345 
Ashland 54 362817 6719 
Total/3 days 95 672528 7079 
The volume per trip figure is computed to offer an increased understanding of 
the risk presented per truck. This runs from a low of 3520 gallons for trucks in Klamath 
Falls, to a high of 9345 gallons for trucks traveling through Ostrander. This volume in 
Ostrander represents the highest per trip amount throughout the study. These figures, 
like the truck movement information, were multiplied by ten and converted to barrels to 
make average monthly projections comparable to the vessel and barge data: 
TABLE VIII 
TRUCK INPUT MONTHLY PROJECTIONS 
Location Trips Volume Volume/Trip Volume Bbls 
Klamath Falls 80 281,620 3,520 6,705 
Ontario 80 479,160 5,990 11,409 
Ostrander 250 2,336,330 9,345 55,627 
Ashland 540 3,628,170 6,719 86,385 
Total/month 950 6,725,280 7,079 160,126 
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The movements of petroleum through these towns can better be displayed as 
graphically. Klamath Falls and Ontario receive a similar number of tank trucks 























Klamath Falls Ontario Ostrander Ashland 
Location 
Fi~ure 11. Monthly projection of tank truck entries into Oregon. 
The majority of movements occur on Interstate 5 northbound through Ashland 
with 540 monthly trips. However, as discussed earlier, some petroleum inputs 
terminating south of this port of entry may not be included in the study. 
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+ Stations Monitoring Truck Movements 9 Stations Monitoring Truck Inputs 
Fillure 12. Monitoring stations for tank truck movements in Oregon. 
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RISK FROM TANK TRUCKS 
Environmental Risk 
Although tank trucks, generally carrying less than 10,000 gallons, represent the 
smallest potential spill, on a per-incident basis they pose the greatest environmental risk 
to petroleum distribution. The Office of State Fire Marshal, in its 1994 Annual Report 
of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon, indicated that 184 spills involving 
petroleum tank trucks occurred, of which 77 involved diesel and 66 involved gasoline. 
These spills totaled 7392 gallons, or an average of 51 gallons per incident. 
Spill risk from the other potential sources (pipelines, ships, barges, and 
railroads) are all limited to particular geographic corridors. For example, any spill from 
the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline will occur within the right of way secured by the pipeline, 
and spreading could be predicted by the topography, proximity to water, and substrate 
material. Likewise any spill from an oil barge will occur within the waterbody used by 
that barge. Tank trucks, on the other hand, travel to the remotest comers of the state, 
and spills from their accidents can pollute pavement, roads, wetlands, ditches, streams, 
or any combination. This will only become more apparent as Oregon's population 
increases in areas such as Bend not served by other petroleum distribution modes. 
Furthermore, tank trucks carry all grades of petroleum products, including everything 
from light distillates to asphalt, so planning for their response is difficult. 
Response to releases from tank trucks is often conducted differently from other 
sources. Since spills from tank trucks generally impede traffic, the primary response is 
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to restore the roadway to its unimpeded condition as expeditiously as possible. 
Unfortunately, this at times leads to the hosing down of polluted roadways into storm or 
other drains which ultimately harm the environment. This contrasts with spills from 
other transportation modes which often damage areas unseen by the general public. 
Therefore, response protocols in these areas examine the environment's ability to 
recover, and serve to enhance that ability. This often means taking litle or no action and 
allowing natural processes to degrade the petroleum. For example, gasoline spilled by a 
tank truck on a roadway poses a threat to public safety and impedes the orderly 
movement of traffic. This gasoline is removed by the most expeditious means, often 
high volume flushing, without regard to its fate or downstream environmental 
consequence. A similar spill of gasoline in a tank farm would be allowed to aerate in 
the tank farm until the light ends have evaporated and the product poses no safety or 
toxic threat. 
Economic Risk 
The majority of tank trucks serving Oregon operate wholly within the state. 
They are therefore subject to economic burdens, such as the petroleum load fee for the 
highway fund, placed upon them by state regulations. Any economic risk Oregon sees 
from this is self imposed, rather than a ramification from international or adjacent state 
policies. We do however, receive tank trucks that are importing products from 
Washington and California. Such trucks would be subject to those state regulations, and 
the corresponding costs of compliance, as well. For example, were California to impose 
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a high petroleum distribution fee on tank trucks, then those providing inputs to Ashland 
or Klamath Falls, may pass that economic burden on to their customers. This places 
those customers at some level of economic risk and should this burden exceed that 
amount which those customers are willing to pay, the distribution system would have to 
adjust for supply shortfalls. 
CHAPTER VI 
RAILROADS IN OREGON 
OVERVIEW 
Oregon enjoys an extensive railroad system providing coverage to most portions 
of the state. However, no bulk petroleum is transported by rail and it therefore 
functions as neither an input, nor movement to the oil distribution system. This chapter 
briefly describes the routes of major rail service throughout Oregon. 
The major rail lines serving Oregon include the Southern Pacific, Union Pacific, 
and Burlington Northern. Southern Pacific operates primarily north-south with a line 
from Portland to Springfield. This line then forks into three. One travels to the western 
edge of Oregon along State Route 26 then moves south into Coos County terminating in 
Myrtle Point. The middle fork continues from Springfield along I5 south to California. 
The eastern fork travels along State Route 58 into Klamath Falls and then into 
California. 
Union Pacific operates a major east-west route departing Portland and traveling 
through the Columbia River Gorge, where it branches in Hermiston. Here, one line 
travels north into Washington, while the other continues southerly and eventually exits 
the state in Ontario. 
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Burlington Northern operates a north-south line beginning in Astoria, then 
traveling southeast along State Route 30 into Portland. This eventually follows the 
Southern Pacific leg south to Springfield. A separate leg of Burlington Northern begins 
at a junction with Union Pacific east of the Dalles, then travels south along State Route 
97 through Bend, where it eventually joins Southern Pacific in Chemult. 
Smaller lines (termed "shortlines") are operated by the Willamette Valley 
Railroad, Klamath Northern, Union Rail of Oregon, Port of Tillamook, Lake County 
operated by Great Western, Willamina and Grand Ronde, Oregon Pacific and Eastern, 
East Portland Traction, City of Prineville, Longview Portland, Mount Hood, and 
Oregon Eastern. 
Railroads are utilized for shipments of hazardous materials and small quantities 
of oil products. These movements were reported to the public utilities commission in 
1992. Reports included products moved by Standard Transportation Commodity Code 
(STCC) and amounts moved but were only detailed to the extent they inform the Public 
Utilities Commission of general types of products moved. More detailed reports, 
although useful, would apparently give away excessive business information, and are 
not submitted (Personal communication with Public Utilities Commission, May 1995). 
Bulk oil movements are not conducted by railroad in Oregon. Southern Pacific 
Railroad maintains oil product storage facilities at rail terminals in Eugene, Portland, 
and Klamath Falls, yet all are inactive (ODOE, 1992). Although rail transport is less 
expensive than truck transport, it is not used for several reasons. Rail transport 
represents defined, limited access distribution capabilities. Many of the population and 
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high use centers served by rail are also served by either barge or pipeline--both of which 
offer a cheaper alternative. Areas not served by barge or pipeline but by rail usually do 
not have the demand for such large shipments and their needs can be met by tank truck 
(Personal communication w/ GA TX, May 1995). Therefore, railroads, like cargo ships, 
are heavy users of petroleum, but do not participate in its distribution. 
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Fi2ure 13. Routes of major railroads operating in Oregon. 
RISK FROM RAILROADS 
Environmental Risk 
Since railroads carry no bulk petroleum as cargo, their enviromnental risk is 
reduced. However, railroads carry tremendous volumes of diesel for the operation of 
their own engines. Generally, each locomotive carries a 3100 gallon "saddle tank" to 
provide that engine with fuel. For long hauls, this saddle tank is augmented by a tank 
car that can refuel the locomotive. 
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Railroads are often situated adjacent to river beds. While such positioning 
provides a flat track surface, it renders them susceptible to flood and ground movement 
risk. Compounding this risk is the exposure seen by the stream or riparian areas when 
spills from locomotives occur. 
Oregon's largest railroad spill occurred after the 1993 Southern Pacific train 
derailment into outside of Eugene. This derailment allowed 6100 gallons of diesel fuel 
to enter Yoncalla Creek, threatening a local water drinking water reservoir and the 
federally protected Western Pond Turtle. Cleanup lasted nearly one month and included 
the use of skimming equipment, oil absorbent materials, monitoring wells, and auxiliary 
water supplies. 
Economic Risk 
Economic risk from railroads does not figure into Oregon's oil budget since they 
are presently not utilized. Were railroads to be used in the distribution process, risk 
would be evident given the interstate nature of the railroads, and the opportunity for 




Normalizing data from pipelines, self propelled tank ships, barges, and tank 
trucks presented in the previous chapters to fit a barrels per month standard allows for a 
comparison of modes. Such a comparison provides an "average month snapshot" of 
petroleum distribution in Oregon. 
TABLE IX 
MONTHLY OIL DISTRIBUTION AVERAGES BY 
TRANSPORTATION MODE IN OREGON 
Transport Mode Trips Input Trips Movement 
Bbls/Month Bbls/Month 
Tank Truck 950 160,125 
Tank Truck 5580 1,058,830 
Oil Pipeline 1 3,816,666 
Oil Pipeline 2 1,650,000 
Self Propelled Tank.ship 10 1, 754,416 
Self Propelled Tank.ship 
Oil Barge (to Coos Bay) 2 33,250 
Oil Barge (to Columbia) 8 240,000 
Oil Barge (to Upriver) 65 1,486,916 
Oil Barge (Bunkering) 75 569,500 
Totals 6,004,457 4,765,246 
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The difference between Input Barrels per Month and Movement Barrels per 
Month is 1,239,211 barrels. This is not an amount that keeps piling up in Portland 
month after month. Rather, this amount accounts for that not counted during the truck 
distribution study, which only monitored petroleum movements outside the 
metropolitan area. Given Oregon's population distribution, it can be assumed with 
relative confidence that this surplus is being moved along the metro area roadways to 
supply home oil tanks, gasoline stations, boat marinas, industries, and other users. 
This information summary should be useful to energy planners, risk analysts, 
and businesses, and citizens interested in petroleum distribution in our state, as well as 
planning for future distribution challenges. Viewed as a map, the results better show 




Pipeline Pipe line 
Barge ~ 3,800,000 Ostrfder, WA 55,627 ] 0,000 
240,000 ~ f ~ 
Tanker ~ _ "t . p.Jff Upriver~ 
1,750,000 r-~ ~arge Downnve 1.S00,00'' ~· 
' 570,000 ~
...,.. Input Barrels _. Movement Barrels 
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upon figures analyzed within this paper. · 
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The make up of this summary may change in the upcoming years with the 
proposed development of Olympic Pipeline Company's Cross-Cascades Pipeline. This 
220 mile underground pipeline will deliver 65,000 barrels daily of motor gasoline, 
diesel fuel and aviation fuel from Western Washington refineries to Central and Eastern 
Washington (Olympic Pipeline Company News Release 1995). The proposal also 
includes a truck distribution terminal near Ellensburg and several small pump stations 
along the route. When complete in 1998, this will not only alter the movement of 
barges to these upriver locations, it may also alter the products flowing through the 
existing Olympic pipeline to Portland. 
Some Washington environmental organizations fear this pipeline may one day 
turn Puget Sound into a major oil port. Presently Puget Sound refineries are supplying 
Washington and Oregon with much of their fuel needs. When this pipeline is complete, 
it will have the capability of linking with the existing Chevron Utah Pipeline which 
originates in the Rangely oil field in northwestern Colorado. Such a link may allow the 
Chevron Utah pipeline to carry products backward from its original design and move 
them from Pasco, WA, to Salt Lake City instead of vice versa. This operation would 
increase the demand for crude oil shipments to the Puget Sound refineries. As these 
shipments increase, so does the environmental risk to Puget Sound waters. 
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In addition to understanding the micro supply and distribution systems in 
Oregon, it is also worthwhile to understand a few elementary facts regarding the macro 
system in the United States to appreciate the risks posed by world events. In 1993, the 
United States imported 3, 111,990,000 barrels of oil or roughly half of its petroleum 
needs. The remainder was produced domestically, primarily by Texas, Alaska, 
California, Louisiana and Oklahoma who combined to produce 2,494,674,000 barrels 
(API Basic Petroleum Data Book, Jan 1995). Of the imported oil, the vast majority (or 
2,972,000 barrels per day) came from Latin American countries--principally Venezuela 
and Mexico. The Middle East provided 1,852,000 barrels per day, West Africa 
(primarily Nigeria) provided 1,311,000 barrels per day, and Canada provided 1, 175,000 
barrels per day (Energy Information Administration, 1994). 
Based upon 1993 data, Texas provides the single largest input to the U.S. 
oil budget, at 752,282,000 barrels, followed by Alaska with 577,494,000 and Saudi 
Arabia with 467,753,000 barrels. Venezuela surpassed Saudi Arabia in June of 1994 as 
the primary foreign supplier of oil to the United States. The following graph depicts the 












Figure 15. Top 10 suppliers of oil to the U. S. oil budget in 1993. Sources 
are split almost exactly between domestic supplies and imports (Source: 
API Basic Petroleum Data Book, Jan 1995). 
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This graph offers a clear view of the risk, or how vulnerable, the United States is 
to particular world events. For example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had little, if any 
effect on our nation's present oil budget. However, economic or cultural problems in 
Latin America would have much more serious ramifications since Venezuela and 
Mexico combine to provide eighteen percent of our national needs. Perhaps 
overshadowing these is the dependence the United States has on the enormous roles 
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played by Texas and Alaska, which both out supply Saudi Arabia and satisfy one third 
of U. S. needs. 
As it relates to Oregon, we are extremely dependent upon the resources of 
Alaska, which make their way to us via California and Washington. However, we do 
not rely upon the supplies from Texas or the Midwest. Severe changes to the supplies 
available from Alaska may affect how oil is supplied and priced in Oregon. 
CHAPTER VIII 
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 
The amount of risk experienced by a state fluctuates with the level of resource 
activity within that state. Timber provides a good example of this for Oregon, where 
the state has long enjoyed a healthy integrated industry from extraction to production to 
distribution. The rewards of such control allowed Oregonians to enjoy low lumber 
prices, abundant supplies, and healthy job markets, but the drawbacks are becoming 
evident in clear cut forests, damaged ecosystems, and silted streams. As the available 
timber declines, so do the employment opportunities for loggers. 
Likewise, "oil states" such as Alaska and Texas with primary petroleum 
industries such as extraction, may experience little economic risk because of their 
indigenous supply, but greater environmental risk associated with removing 
hydrocarbons from the ground. States such as Washington with secondary petroleum 
industries such as refining experience slightly less environmental risk since drilling and 
extraction do not exist, but live with environmental threats from the operation of major 
refiners. Conversely, they should be able to partially shield themselves from price 
increases as they can purchase crude oils on the spot market. States such as Oregon, 
involved in tertiary petroleum activities such as distribution do not realize the same 
environmental risk as those that are refining or extracting, but should experience greater 
economic risk with the reliance on petroleum exports from adjacent states. It is only 
through understanding this risk that it can be managed. 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
Since Oregon's involvement in petroleum includes no primary nor secondary 
industries, the majority of environmental risk comes from transportation. Oregon, like 
all states, is polluted daily by unintended transportation-related releases. Quantifying 
these releases becomes problematic for several reasons. Spills to surface water are 
reported to the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington D. C., which maintains a nationwide 
database. Often these spills receive no response as cleanup becomes unfeasible given 
the swift currents of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers. 
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In addition to federal notification, all spills are reported to the Oregon 
Emergency Response System (OERS) in Salem, which acts as a clearinghouse for initial 
notification. This would seemingly be a good source of annual spill data, however, 
OERS consolidates all petroleum and hazardous material spills together into hazardous 
substances, and it is therefore impossible to extract meaningful information regarding 
petroleum distribution. This is compounded with the fact that their volume estimates 
are based purely on initial reports, which often vary from the final assessment. 
Transportation related incidents are included in the Office of the State Fire 
Marshal's annual report of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon. This summation 
stems from the reports made to them throughout the year by responsible parties, 
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concerned citizens, law enforcement personnel, and accident victims, and does the most 
thorough job of assessing the daily losses of petroleum from land-based-distribution 
related spills. Data from 1994 indicated that 184 spills from tank trucks involving 
petroleum products occurred, of which 77 involved diesel and 66 involved gasoline. 
These spills totaled 7392 gallons, or 616 gallons (14.6 barrels) per month (Office of 
State Fire Marshal, 1994 Annual Report of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon). 
Based upon this data, one transportation related petroleum spill occurs every two days 
in Oregon, releasing 20 gallons (.5 barrel). These releases are not included in the oil 
distribution budget as they are already accounted for when they are transferred to a tank 
truck, pipeline, or barge. Assessing the "seriousness" of these spills is challenging as 
explained below. 
Assessing the "seriousness," or level of environmental consequence, is often 
difficult. In the most economic sense it is conducted through natural resource damage 
assessments, which are historically based upon contingent valuation methods. Such 
methods assess a value to injured species based upon market prices, public perceptions, 
and scientific bases for their "worth." Easy valuations can be made for market species 
(e.g. salmon) noticeably damaged and easily understood by the general populace. The 
contingent valuation method has more difficulty assessing the worth of non-market 
species (e.g. nutria) and relies on questionnaires for value estimation. 
Outside of the natural resource damage assessment process, the level of 
environmental consequence is simply a function of the oil type and size and the 
characteristics of the affected ecosystem. When oil is released to the environment, its 
characteristics determine how it experiences spreading, evaporation, dispersion, 
emulsification, dissolution, oxidation, sedimentation, and biodegradation. 
The oil type will determine if it is a non-persistent oil, which is composed of 
light petroleum fractions and will tend to dissipate rapidly from the surface, or a 
persistent oil such as residual fuel oil which will dissipate more slowly. The main 
physical properties which affect the behavior of spilled oil are its specific gravity, 
distillation characteristics, viscosity and pour point. Oils with a low specific gravity 
such as gasoline are non- persistent and readily incorporated into the environment, yet 
pose acute toxic threats to animals coming in contact. Persistent oils, generally with 
high specific gravities, do not provide the same toxic affects to animals, but remain in 
the ecosystem longer and pose mechanical threats such as matting of feathers or fur. 
Spill size will have a direct relation on the environment's ability to assimilate the 
pollutant. 
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Ecosystem characteristics determining the "seriousness" of a spill include the 
resident species and their sensitivity to hydrocarbons and the level of natural activity 
from winds, waves and surface runoff. A little oil in a sensitive area can do as much 
harm as a large quantity on a desolate rocky shore. The tanker Braer spill occurring off 
the Shetlands dumped five times the amount of crude oil than the Exxon Valdez, yet did 
so in a high energy environment along a rocky shoreline. Cleanup lasted but a few days 
as the oil was assimilated into the environment through dispersion, dissolution and 
evaporation, and follow-up bioassays indicate little damage. Cleanup for the Exxon 
Valdez spill lasted over two years and is still being evaluated for long term affects. 
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Given this, quantifying the "seriousness" of tank truck spills in Oregon becomes 
perplexing, although it can be approximated that the 7000 gallons spilled annually poses 
no significant long term threat to the health of Oregonians or the environment when 
compared with the many other pollutant sources. 
ECONOMIC RISK 
Economic risk refers to the opportunity for a commodity's price or supply to 
fluctuate in response to forces beyond Oregon's control. Since Oregon has little control 
over its inputs of petroleum, economic risk is prevalent. Also part of economic risk is 
the employment risk associated with extractive (primary) industries reliant upon natural 
resources., As described in the logging example at the beginning of this chapter, 
primary industry employment fluctuates with the level of natural resource supply. 
Secondary industries, such as saw mills or oil refineries, are better suited to shield 
themselves from this employment risk by securing outside supplies of natural resources. 
Supply Risk 
Following World War II, Oregonians decided to renew their interest in securing 
a domestic source of petroleum. As part of this renewed interest, Chester Sterrett, 
Manager of the Industries Department of the Portland Chamber of Commerce, 
completed a study on the fuel oil requirements of Oregon and Southern Washington. 
Many of the figures determined by Sterrett are meaningless today given the regions 
economic and population growth, but many of his ideas ring true. 
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In 1950, all of the fuel used in the lower Columbia River area was brought in 
from California tankers. The Portland area suffered restricted deliveries of fuel during 
the previous decade, primarily on account of the demand from war industries. Sterrett, 
desiring fuel shortages to be a thing of the past, reported, "On account of increased 
industrialization of the Pacific Northwest, the whole economy of the region would be 
disrupted if supply of fuel were cut off or reduced." He continued, "One thing is 
certain: the lower Columbia River area, for maximum safety and future industrial 
growth, must encourage, as soon as possible, fuel supply sources other than offshore 
tanker supply" (Sterrett, 1950, p. 5). 
His pleas were not only heard, but met in the development of the Olympic 
Pipeline in the mid 1960s. This pipeline is not immune to fluctuations in the world 
petroleum supply, however. The OPEC oil embargo of the mid 1970s created 
worldwide shortages. Since petroleum is a world commodity, even nations and states 
with domestic sources of oil were affected. The following graph shows Olympic 
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Figure 16. Olympic Oil Pipeline Activity 1972-1976 (Source: Oregon 
Department of Transportation, 1979). 
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Although it does not appear there was a significant change during the mid 1970s 
embargo, when the barrels are examined as a percentage change from year to year, the 
severity of the embargo is more evident. The following graph shows the decrease in oil 
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Fi~ure 17. Olympic Pipeline Activity Displayed in Percentage Change 
1972-1976 (Source: Oregon Department of Transportation, 1979). 
During this period the Chevron pipeline in Eastern Oregon was also providing 
inputs into Oregon's oil budget on the average of 1500 barrels annually. However, 
these inputs were not enough to alter the change seen in the 197 4 figures. 
Seven states actually increased their consumption during this period. Alaska, 
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Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming consumed more petroleum 
in 1974 than in the previous year. Of those seven, all but Connecticut and Hawaii have 
extensive petroleum reserves, and shielded themselves from necessary cutbacks using 
their indigenous supplies and refining capabilities. Connecticut and Hawaii somehow 
managed to secure reliable sources of supply in the face of the embargo. 
Price Risk 
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The 1974 oil crisis not only altered the amount of oil entering Oregon, it also 
affected its price. A gallon of gasoline cost thirty-five cents throughout the early 1970s, 
and quickly increased to fifty-one cents in 1974. This pattern was evident in Portland, 
as well as other West Coast cities, and the United States. From 1974 on, the price 
continued to gradually increase, although not at the rate it did during the OPEC 
embargo. 
Twenty years later, changes still occur following a significant "petroleum related 
event." Gasoline prices typically fluctuate with the driving season, which is defined as 
mid-summer through Labor Day. These fluctuations are simply a case of supply versus 
demand, as can be seen in home heating oil prices, which increase during the winter, but 
are held low throughout the remaining year. Several "petroleum related events" provide 
evidence of the price vulnerability of the oil industry, and how consumers become 
affected by events that appear completely unrelated to them. Often, the magnitude of 
the petroleum involved is unrelated to the magnitude of the price change. Rather the 
magnitude of the price change may be related to media coverage, public interest, market 
opportunity. 
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez occurred in late March 1989, and prices 
increased not only on the west coast, but throughout the United States. Although most 
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portions of the United States do not receive a drop of Alaskan oil, consumer prices were 
still affected. Later that year an Exxon refinery in Louisiana suffered a catastrophic 
explosion, killing two, and forcing evacuations. A small spike in the U.S. price 
occurred, although the west, which already had its share of Exxon news, appeared 
unaffected. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait the following summer, and as it appeared 
he was going to control Kuwaiti oil, prices shot up throughout the U.S. and the West 
Coast, even though the West Coast receives not a drop of Middle Eastern crude. Once 
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Figure 18. Gasoline prices were affected to greater degrees depending 
upon the nature of "petroleum related" casualty. The Exxon Valdez spill 
forced prices up across the United States. A swift victory in the Persian 
Gulf by U.S. Forces led to a rapid decline in prices throughout the U.S. 
even though much of the country receives no oil from that region (Source 
U.S. Federal Highway Administration). 
While Oregon may experience supply risk as a result of its lack of crude oil, it 
does not appear vulnerable to price risk brought on by world or local events any greater 
than the states on the upstream end of its oil supplies. 
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ECONOMICS VERSUS ENVIRONMENT 
Supply obviously affects the level of risk experienced economically and 
environmentally. Depending upon the individual, low economic risk with high 
environmental risk may be acceptable. In other words, some may prefer the threat of oil 
well blowouts and crude oil spill~ to the benefits secure oil sources and prices. 
For straight production, Texas tops the list today at 619,088,000 barrels of oil 
produced during 1993. Following in descending order are Alaska (577,494,000), 
California (293,089,000), Louisiana (138,673,000), and Oklahoma (96,624,000). 
Louisiana's respectable 138,673,000 barrels in 1993, or roughly twice the needs of 
Oregon, represented a sharp decrease from the previous year, when they produced 
420,555,000 barrels, or seven times the needs of Oregon. Trends such as this increase 
Louisiana's employment risk. 
Reserves of oil are extremely important. Texas also leads the U.S. in total 
reserves with 6,171,000,000 barrels confirmed in 1993. Rounding out the list are 
Alaska, California, Louisiana, and Oklahoma (API Basic Petroleum Data Book, 1995). 
Alaska has a reserve situated under the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge which would 
bolster its total to well above that of Texas. However, permission to extract the reserves 
has not been granted because of environmental considerations and risks. 
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Worldwide Price Comparisons 
Overall, motor gasoline taxes in the United States are extremely low. Even with 
the average state tax included, the U. S. tax on a gallon of gasoline is one seventh that of 
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Figure 19. Tax price per gallon assessed in major countries of the world. 
Prices are in U.S. dollars using recent conversion factors (Source: 
Federal Highway Administration Monthly Reports from States, July 
1995). 
Such tax disparities give quick confirmation the U.S. governments desire to 
keep motor gasoline a cheap energy source. Such policies may undermine the incentive 
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for alternative fuel and alternative transportation developments. Outside of the United 
States, the rights to oil are normally vested in the state. This means that the right to 
explore requires some form of grant or consent from the state in which the rights have 
been vested. (Jones, 1988) Since no such policies exist within the United States, 
petroleum exploration and production is strictly profit driven, and low taxes are deemed 
necessary to keep profits high and encourage oil development. 
Local Price Comparisons 
The low economic risks are rarely passed on to consumers in the form of low 
prices. Oregon's state motor gasoline tax rate is 24 cents per gallon. This is added to a 
federal gasoline tax of 18.4 cents. Along the West Coast, the Washington and 
California state gas taxes are 23 cents and 18 cents respectively. Connecticut leads the 
nation with the highest rate of 32 cents per gallon and Georgia anchors the list with 7.5 
cents per gallon. The national average is 20 cents per gallon (Federal Highway 
Administration Monthly Motor Fuel Reports by State, July 1995). 
Given this, one would expect a gallon of gasoline in Oregon to cost more than 
that same gallon in Washington. Not only is the state tax higher, but self serve gasoline 
is prohibited in Oregon, and the fuel must be transported by one of the modes described 
earlier. Gasoline prices for a major city in each state were monitored and published 
until 1977 by a private concern. When the private concern ceased, the Federal Highway 
Administration began collecting the same information except on a major population 
center basis. Therefore, information exists for areas such as New York City, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Washington D.C. Unfortunately, pricing information 
was not maintained for smaller areas such as Portland or Seattle. The information for 
areas such as these could be approximated based upon Department of Labor statistics 
and their consumer price indexing. For western states, the consumer price index is 
limited to category A (small) cities, or category C (large cities). 
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Beginning in January 1994, data collection on a per state basis commenced 
again, and is purchased from a private concern by the Federal Highway Administration. 
This data allows for a comparison of recent prices in Oregon and Washington for not 
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Figure 20. Price per gallon (excluding taxes) for motor gasoline and 
home heating oil for Oregon and Washington January 1994 - present 
(Source: Federal Highway Administration Monthly State Summaries 
July 1995, and National Petroleum News June 1995). 
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Gasoline and home heating oil play very different roles in petroleum economics. 
Gasoline accounts for almost half of all products sold, and is subject to the finest in 
marketing efforts available. Home heating oil is sold in smaller quantities each year as 
houses to convert to other forms of heat. It also is not marketed by major oil companies 
with any of the consumer based effort that motor gasoline is subject to. The information 
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in the graph above suggests that not only does distribution play a minor role in the 
pricing of oil products, but demand serves as the overriding factor. This is evident in 
the very deliberate price fluctuations of home heating oil, and the distinct decrease 
during summer months, followed by the winter increase. Perhaps more interesting is 
the price difference between motor gasoline in Oregon and Washington, which indicates 
that this product is similarly priced in both states, even though greater distribution and 
labor costs are incurred in Oregon. 
These pricing figures indicate that oil prices do not adhere to local differences 
between source and use. Rather oil is a worldwide commodity, and crude prices are 
affected in response to many activities. Such responses keep "oil states" from enjoying 
the low prices typically associated with indigenous supplies, and allows "non-oil states" 
such as Oregon, to enjoy similarly priced petroleum. This further benefits "non-oil 
states" in that they do not have to live with environmental risk associated with the 
primary extractive industries. In other words, Oregon gets to enjoy petroleum products 
at the same, if not lower, prices as states who control their entire supplies, yet is not 
burdened with the environmental risks of extraction and production. This appears to be 
a favorable position for Oregon or similar states. 
The distribution systems detailed in this analysis are not static, and outside 
forces such as the export of Alaska North Slope Crude oil, the increased exploration of 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or California offshore oil fields, and the future 
development of a cross-Cascades pipeline may all serve to alter this scheme. 
Oregonians can ensure the most efficient, effective reliable and safe petroleum 
distribution systems only through a comprehensive understanding of how we get oil 
from source to use. A geographical analysis provides this understanding. 
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